Experiencing simulated outcomes by Robin Hogarth & Emre Soyer










Experiencing sequentially simulated outcomes:  





  Emre Soyer
1    





    
 





Whereas much literature has documented difficulties in making probabilistic inferences, it has 
also emphasized the importance of task characteristics in determining judgmental accuracy. 
Noting that people exhibit remarkable efficiency in encoding frequency information sequentially, 
we construct tasks that exploit this ability by requiring people to experience the outcomes of 
sequentially simulated data. We report two experiments. The first involved seven well-known 
probabilistic inference tasks. Participants differed in statistical sophistication and answered with 
and without experience obtained through sequentially simulated outcomes in a design that 
permitted both between- and within-subject analyses. The second experiment involved 
interpreting the outcomes of a regression analysis when making inferences for investment 
decisions. In both experiments, even the statistically naïve make accurate probabilistic inferences 
after experiencing sequentially simulated outcomes and many prefer this presentation format. We 
conclude by discussing theoretical and practical implications. 
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“I have come to feel that the only learning which significantly influences behavior is self-
discovered, self appropriated learning” (Carl Rogers, 1961, p.276).   
 
In the last five decades, many studies have documented difficulties people have in reasoning 
probabilistically (see, e.g., Cohen 1960; 1972; Edwards, 1968; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 
1982; Hogarth, 1975; 1987). One way of characterizing this literature is to note that whereas 
people have well-developed capacities for dealing with data in the form of frequencies and 
averages (Peterson & Beach, 1967; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983), they have greater 
difficulty in understanding concepts of variability, the role of random error in phenomena such 
as regression toward the mean, and implications of probabilistic reasoning that involve 
combinations of events (see, e.g., Lathrop, 1967; Bar-Hillel, 1973; Cohen & Chesnik, 1970; 
Cohen, Chesnik, & Haran, 1971; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 
1983). The human mind, it seems, is quite effective at aggregating information in an additive 
manner but the multiplicative demands of probability theory are hard to master (Juslin, Nilsson, 
& Winman, 2009).  
In considering this state of affairs, it is important to recall that, although humans have 
always faced uncertainty, probability theory itself only dates from the mid-17
th century (Daston, 
1988), and is a discipline that requires considerable intellectual abstraction. It is thus not 
unreasonable to conjecture that probability theory solves some problems in ways that are foreign 
to the response tendencies that have been honed by human evolutionary forces. At the same time, 
however, the demands of our modern, technologically oriented society increasingly require the 
ability to understand the implications of statistical reasoning. In managing an investment 
portfolio, for example, it is essential to understand the distributional implications of potential EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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returns to assess tradeoffs between risks and returns. In the practice of medicine, failing to assess 
correctly the probabilistic implications of test results can have disastrous consequences. And yet, 
most of the time, people – including professionals – deal with statistical information in an 
intuitive manner that may or may not lead to appropriate inferences (Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, 
Kurz-Milke, Schwartz, & Wolosihn, 2007).   
An argument can always be made for better teaching of statistical reasoning. However, 
whereas we are not against “better teaching” (who is?), we doubt whether this is a solution. The 
reason is that whatever is taught needs to be reinforced through practice and feedback and it is 
not clear that there will always be opportunities for all types of problems. What is needed is a 
general approach – based on well-established theoretical and empirical grounds – that can be 
easily adapted to specific situations. In fact, the main implication of this paper will be to suggest 
such an approach. 
  In an extensive review of issues of risk perception and communication in the medical 
domain, Gigerenzer et al. (2007) note that the ways in which statistical information is presented 
have large, and often predictable effects on the inferences people draw. For example, people are 
impacted far more by descriptions of risk reduction – due, say, to some intervention or treatment 
– when this is expressed in relative as opposed to absolute terms, e.g., as 50% instead of from 2 
in 1,000 to 1 in 1,000. Similarly, physicians show remarkable improvements in probabilistic 
reasoning – using Bayesian updating when interpreting test results (e.g., mammograms) – when 
data are presented in natural frequency format as opposed to the more typical probabilistic 
statements (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Cosmides & Tooby, 1966; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 
1998;  Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000; Brase, 2008). Indeed, frequency 
representations have also been observed to improve inferences in the famous “Linda” problem EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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(Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Fiedler, 1988; Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999), “sample size” tasks 
(Sedlmeier, 1998)
1, and the “Monty Hall” problem (Krauss & Wang, 2003). In summarizing 
these and other studies, Gigerenzer et al. (2007) wisely state  
….statistical literacy is largely a function of the outside world and …can be fostered by 
education and, even more simply, by representing numbers in ways that are transparent 
to the human mind (p. 54, italics added). 
 
  Unfortunately, it is not always clear how to define a priori what is “transparent to the 
human mind” in the presentation of statistical data.  For example, graphs may or may not be 
helpful in different circumstances (Soyer & Hogarth, 2010), and providing probabilistic 
information in frequency formats does not guarantee that people will make appropriate 
inferences (Griffin & Buehler, 1999; Mellers & McGraw, 1999; Hoffrage, Gigerenzer, Krauss, & 
Martignon, 2002). 
  Nonetheless, the work of Gigerenzer and his colleagues suggests a research strategy: first, 
identify the cognitive mechanisms that people perform well naturally (i.e., without specific 
training); and second, structure statistical inference tasks in a form that exploits these 
mechanisms.  
  In this paper, we follow this strategy. First, we identify one important mechanism that 
humans have been demonstrated to possess in terms of handling data; specifically, the ability to 
encode automatically in memory frequency information about events they experience across 
time.
2 Second, by using simulations we provide statistical representations of problems that allow 
                                                           
1 The “hospital problem” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) that we present below is an example of a “sample size” task. 
2 As an everyday example of this mechanism, imagine that you are asked how many times you have been to the 
cinema (or undertaken another similar activity) in the last three months. Most people have little difficulty in 
providing a rapid and fairly accurate answer to this question.  And yet, they do not consciously record the frequency 
of their visits to the cinema or make a mental note (of this or other frequencies) in case someone asks the question 
just posed. EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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people to exploit this mechanism, that is, by providing opportunities to experience sequentially 
generated frequency data.   
Whereas using simulated data in this general manner may seem “obvious” to statistical 
practitioners, there is a remarkable lack of systematic scientific evidence concerning its use as 
suggested here. In fact, we know of only two studies that have explicitly investigated effects on 
probabilistic inference of experiencing sequential frequency data. In the first, Christensen-
Szalanski and Beach (1982) investigated whether sequentially observing 100 instances of either 
base-rate or base-rate and diagnostic information would impact subsequent assessments of 
Bayesian posterior probabilities. They found no effect for base-rate information alone, but a 
favorable impact for base-rate and diagnostic information. In the second study, Betsch, Biel, 
Eddelbüttel, and Mock (1998) showed that, when people explicitly sampled frequency 
information, they were more appropriately sensitive to base rates in a Bayesian updating task 
than if provided with probabilistic information.  In a related investigation,  Sedlmeier (1999, Chs. 
10, 11) has used what he terms a “flexible urn model” in the shape of a computer simulation 
model that does allow participants to observe data dynamically and where their probabilistic 
inferences are quite accurate. (We consider Sedlmeier’s work again in the General Discussion.) 
The evidence on the natural encoding of frequency information is both uncontroversial 
and overwhelming. It has been summarized by, amongst others, Hasher and Zacks (1979; 1984) 
and Zacks and Hasher (2002). As their studies show, humans have a remarkable capacity for the 
accurate encoding of frequency information. Moreover, this cognitive activity demands little by 
way of attention, does not require intention, is invariant to learning, age, and many individual 
differences, and also involves recognizing the frequencies of subcategories of experienced 
events. That it is a basic cognitive mechanism that was probably developed through evolutionary EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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pressures is reinforced by the findings that several non-human species show similar capacities, 
e.g., in understanding frequency distributions associated with different sources of food. 
Moreover, consistent with this evidence is that accumulated by Fiedler and his colleagues 
concerning human sampling of data for inferential purposes (Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler, Brinkmann, 
Bestsch, & Wild, 2000; Fiedler & Juslin, 2006). These authors show that people are quite 
accurate in encoding the data they have observed; the blame for systematic inferential errors, 
they argue, lies with failures to exercise the meta-cognitive judgment necessary to offset biases 
in the sampling process.  
  Our suggestion, therefore, is to transform statistical reasoning problems into a form that 
exploits the ability to encode and interpret sequentially observed frequency information. That is, 
instead of asking people to solve statistical reasoning problems analytically, we propose having 
them experience frequency data sequentially thereby allowing their natural encoding capabilities 
to inform their answers. Before proceeding, however, we make three important remarks.  
  First, our work builds on the pioneering contributions of Gigerenzer and his colleagues 
who perceptively drew attention to the difference between representing probabilistic problems by 
natural frequencies as opposed to probabilities. Our innovation consists of extending their 
argument to what we consider its logical conclusion. Specifically, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 
(1995, p. 686) defined natural frequencies as “actually experienced in a series of events” noting 
that “From animals to neural networks, systems seem to learn about contingencies through 
sequential encoding and updating of event frequencies…”. They further expanded on the 
meaning of natural sampling as involving the “sequential acquisition of information by updating 
event frequencies without artificially fixing the marginal frequencies” (p. 686).  On the other 
hand, as far as we can tell, participants in their experiments never actually experienced data EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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sequentially, that is, “as a series of events.” Instead, they observed totals. That is, Gigerenzer and 
his colleagues presented data in the form of summarized natural frequencies. 
This is an important point. Experience is typically not in the form of summed frequencies 
presented in some tabular format. Instead, frequencies (as described by Hasher and Zacks above) 
are characterized by being experienced sequentially – one-at-a-time – across some period of time 
and/or space. The foraging animal, for example, does not consult a table of data in a natural 
frequency format when deciding which of two potential sites has produced more food. Instead, 
across time it has accumulated experience – either directly or by observation – of how often the 
two sources have yielded food. To test, therefore, whether frequency data lead to accurate 
probabilistic inferences, one must allow the organism to experience the data in sequential format 
as opposed to simply providing a count.
   
  Second, numerous studies conducted with animals have shown appropriate sensitivity to 
environmental probabilities and, for the most part, what could be considered rational behavior 
(see, e.g., Real, 1991; 1996; Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 2004). However, it is important to 
emphasize that to test animals’ response tendencies in these studies, it was necessary to have 
them first observe sequentially generated frequency data.
3   
  Third, to provide somebody with a sequential frequency representation of a probabilistic 
problem requires the ability to construct an appropriate simulation model. This, it could be 
argued, implies a greater “input” on behalf of the person structuring the problem with the 
consequence that results should not be compared with attempts to answer problems in the usual 
probabilistic formats. We have three answers to this objection. One is that knowing how to 
present probabilistic information in natural frequency formats (see, e.g., Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 
                                                           
3 Alex Kacelnik, personal communication, April 2010. EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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1995) also requires more knowledge than just presenting respondents with the usual probabilistic 
format. The second is that allowing respondents to experience “raw” data seems the simplest test 
of human ability to handle statistical problems. And third, as noted above, the presentation of 
sequential frequency information is the norm in studies of rational behavior in animals. Thus, if 
it is legitimate to allow animals to use this form of data presentation, why deny humans? 
  In this paper, we test the effects on statistical inference of experiencing sequentially 
simulated outcomes in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we present participants with seven 
well-known problems from the literature. These concern (1) Bayesian updating, (2) the 
“birthday” problem, (3) the conjunction problem, (4) the Linda problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983), (5) the hospital problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), (6) regression toward the mean, 
and (7) the Monty Hall problem. Two groups of participants, familiar with statistical reasoning, 
answer these questions both with and without the aid of experience in the form of sequentially 
simulated outcomes in a design that permits both between- and within-subject comparisons. 
Participants are further required to provide a third answer to determine their remuneration. 
Finally, a further group of statistically naïve participants answers all questions without and then 
with the aid of experience. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrate that being exposed to 
sequentially experienced data leads to more accurate statistical inferences and judgments that 
benefit from experience are preferred over analytic responses when providing final answers. 
Moreover, these important results apply across the range of statistical sophistication that we 
investigate.  
  The task used in Experiment 2 is inherently more complicated than those in Experiment 
1. Specifically, we investigate effects of experiencing sequentially simulated outcomes on 
understanding the probabilistic implications of a regression model in the context of an economic EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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investment. Once again we compare responses of participants varying in statistical 





We varied two between-subject factors in an incomplete 2 x 2 design in which all 
participants gave three answers to each of seven questions (thereby also allowing within-subject 
comparisons). One between-subject factor was level of statistical sophistication. We compared 
responses of advanced undergraduate students who had taken classes in statistical reasoning and 
probability theory with those of a group of older, university-educated adults with less formal 
statistical knowledge. The second between-subject factor was whether participants first answered 
the questions before experiencing sequentially simulated outcomes, and then again after having 
done so, as opposed to the reverse, that is, first after having experienced sequentially simulated 
outcomes, and then without having done so. This second factor, however, was incomplete in that 
it was only varied for the advanced undergraduate students.   
The experimental design is illustrated in Table 1. As shown there, one group of advanced 
undergraduates first answered all seven questions without having experienced sequentially 
simulated outcomes. In contrast, the second group of undergraduates first answered after 
experiencing sequentially simulated outcomes. After each answer provided in the second task 
(with and without simulated outcomes, as appropriate), both groups were required to state a final 
answer that, if correct, would earn them € 1.00 (for each correct answer). We refer to these two 
groups as “Sophisticated A” and “Sophisticated B,” respectively. EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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The group of university-educated adults only answered the questions in one order: before 
and then after having experienced sequentially simulated outcomes. They also gave a final 
answer but were not remunerated financially for either their accuracy or participation. We refer 
to this group as “Naïve.”  
The particular questions used in the experiment were chosen because they represent a 
range of well-known problems that people typically answer incorrectly. 
 (Insert Table 1 about here) 
Participants 
Sixty-two undergraduate students were recruited from two classes at Universitat Pompeu 
Fabra and assigned at random to the Sophisticated A and Sophisticated B groups (31 to each). 
The students were in the 3
rd/4
th year of undergraduate studies in business and/or economics and 
had all taken courses in probability and statistics. When asked to indicate their level of comfort 
in probabilistic and statistical reasoning on a 5-point scale going from “does not know or 
remember anything” (1) to “expert and can teach others” (5) with a mid-point at “remembers 
some of the things and did well in related courses” (3), the mean self-reported rating for both 
groups was 3 (SD, 0.4). The average age of the Sophisticated groups was 22 and 52% were 
female. The mean remuneration participants received – for the correctness of their final answers 
– was € 4.51. 
   The Naïve group consisted of 20 university-educated adults recruited through personal 
contacts of one of the authors. Their mean age was 39 (range from 24 to 59) and 50% were 
female. In terms of statistical sophistication, the mean self-reported rating (using the same scale 
as the undergraduates above) was 2 (or “knows or remembers little” with a standard deviation of 





  Participants made individual appointments to meet with the experimenter and were alone 
with him when answering questions.
4 Experimental sessions lasted, on average, 42 minutes per 
participant.  
When responses were made without experiencing simulated outcomes, participants 
simply responded to the questions in written form. Participants were free to make calculations 
using paper and pencil and/or use calculators.       
  Prior to asking a participant to provide answers with the aid of simulated experience, the 
experimenter first explained the concept of simulation using the example of a coin toss. After the 
explanation, the participant was invited to participate in and experience the simulation of a coin 
toss by using a mouse to click on the screen of a personal computer. Each click resulted in one 
simulated outcome with the result that the participant could experience the string of outcomes 
produced (“heads” = 0, “tails” = 1) by successive trials.
5 Any questions about simulation were 
then clarified by the experimenter. This exercise took approximately two minutes for each 
participant and is included in the time spent on the whole experiment.  
  When responses were made after experiencing simulated outcomes (after the coin toss 
example), the participants responded to each of the seven questions using simulations on a 
personal computer that followed the same modus operandi as the simulated coin toss.  After the 
participants had read each question, the experimenter informed them what the program was 
                                                           
4 For this experiment, we deemed it important to give individual attention to each participant to handle technical 
issues concerning the simulation technology. 
5 All the simulations used in this work were programmed in MS Excel. EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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doing in each simulation, e.g., for the birthday problem it was explained that each click resulted 
in seeing the outcome associated with a group of 25 randomly chosen individuals. Then 
participants started sampling by clicking with the mouse. The manner of sampling outcomes was 
left to each participant’s discretion, i.e., number of trials, time taken per trial, and even different 
numbers of samples. At any time during the sampling, participants were free to stop and 
summarize the data they had experienced up to that point, i.e., to visualize the size of the sample 
created and to assess outcomes. Occasionally, participants asked questions about the simulation 
mechanism and the experimenter answered in a standard manner to avoiding giving cues as to 
“correct” responses to the probabilistic inference questions.
6 
  For those participants who answered first after experiencing simulated outcomes 
(Sophisticated B), the simulation methodology and questions were presented first (as just 
explained above); once this was completed, they answered all seven questions without 
experiencing simulated outcomes. All participants, in all conditions, answered the different 
problems in individually randomized orders.   
  Table 2 provides details of the seven problems respondents were required to answer. 
Answers to the seven problems are provided in Appendix A.  
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
  Finally, because the experiment was conducted in a multi-lingual environment, care was 
taken to ensure that the participants were fluent in the languages used, being Spanish (mainly), 
English, or Turkish.  
 
                                                           
6  In each case, the experimenter responded saying: “The program simulates correctly the current situation/problem 
and provides you with an outcome each time you click.”   EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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Results of Experiment 1 
Before discussing the main results, we first make a few comments about the participants’ 
simulation experiences. First, the mean sizes of samples (i.e., number of simulated outcomes) per 
problem were almost the same for the two Sophisticated groups, 66 (SD, 46) and 65 (SD, 52) for 
A and B, respectively, but lower in the Naïve group which had a mean of 49 (SD, 37). The 
Sophisticated-Naïve difference is significant (t = 3.67, p<.001). Second, when simulating, nearly 
80% of participants in Groups A and B took a small sample first and then gradually increased the 
sample size and updated their first impressions almost always toward the estimates they obtained 
from the larger sample. For the Naïve group this figure was 40%. Third, only four Sophisticated 
participants simulated multiple samples within a question. Finally, the groups differed in how 
long they took to answer the problems: members of Sophisticated A spent on average 19.6 
minutes (SD, 4.3) on the first task of solving the problems analytically and 23.1 minutes (SD, 
3.9) on the second task, whereas members of Sophisticated B spent on average 25.5 minutes 
(SD, 4.7) on the first task of experiencing the outcomes through simulation and 15.4 minutes 
(SD, 3.9) on the second task.   
Table 3 provides an overview of the percentage of correct responses to the seven 
problems broken down by experimental conditions and groups. Figures 1 through 7 provide full 
information on responses made in all conditions by all groups to the seven problems. To simplify 
presentation, we refer to answers made without having experienced simulated outcomes by the 
term “Analytic.” “Experience” refers to answers made after experiencing simulated outcomes. 
(Insert Table 3 and Figures 1 through 7 about here) 
Some general trends can be observed from Table 3. First, across all problems and groups, 
the percentage of correct answers after experience exceeds that of the analytic responses, and EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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typically by a large margin. Second, with one exception, the percentage of correct final answers 
lies between their experience and analytic counterparts (the exception is the Conjunction 
problem). This suggests that whereas participants were capable of interpreting their experience, 
they still wanted to give some weight to their analytic responses. Third, there are order effects. 
More participants in Sophisticated B (who answered after using experience first) gave accurate 
analytic responses than those in Sophisticated A. Experience clearly affected analytic responses. 
Finally, whereas the analytic responses of the Naïve group are generally less accurate than their 
Sophisticated counterparts, their post-experience and final answers are quite comparable. 
Statistical tests supporting all the above statements are provided in Appendix B. We now 
comment on each problem by referring to the appropriate figures. 
Figure 1 reports the result of the Bayesian updating task. As in all the other figures 
related to Experiment 1, we display nine graphs. The three graphs in the top row report the data 
for the analytic responses for the three groups (from left to right, Sophisticated A, Sophisticated 
B, and Naïve, respectively). The middle and bottom rows show the analogous data for the 
experience and final responses. 
The specific version of the Bayesian updating problem was taken from Gigerenzer et al. 
(2007). This was employed in a continuing education program in which 160 gynecologists were 
instructed how to use natural frequencies for solving Bayesian updating problems. The results of 
that session were quite successful. Whereas only 21% of the 160 gynecologists provided the 
correct answer before training, the percentage rose to 87% after training. 
The comparison with our results can be seen by looking down the left-most column of 
graphs in Figure 1. Only 5 out of 29 (17%) answer correctly initially (similar to Gigerenzer’s 
21%). However, after experience 28 out of 29 (97%) answer correctly although this figure drops EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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to 23 out of 29 (79%) for the final answer. In short, our results are comparable to those achieved 
with the natural frequency method. Moreover, it is probably as easy (or easier) to provide the 
instructions for experiencing simulated outcomes than to teach the calculations required to use 
natural frequencies.  
 Figure 2 displays results for the birthday problem. Here we note that analytic responses 
are skewed for all three groups toward incorrect, low values. Experience makes a dramatic 
difference. In this specific case it is obtained through simulating binary outcomes where “1” 
means there are at least two people with the same birthday in a group of 25 people and “0” 
otherwise. Whereas the actual percentage correct is less than in other problems, the answers of a 
clear majority are close to correct. This pattern is mainly maintained in the final response by the 
Sophisticated groups but here the Naïve group exhibits a quite wide dispersion of responses, 
sometimes preferring a “middle” solution between the outcomes of the two tasks. 
The results of the conjunction problem in Figure 3 are clear. The analytic responses are 
somewhat dispersed. But experience makes a big difference that is largely maintained by all 
groups in their final responses. 
For the Linda problem – Figure 4 – we consider only whether participants recognized that 
the event “bank teller and active in the feminist movement” could not be more likely than “bank 
teller.”  Parenthetically, for this problem participants experienced a vector of “1”’s and “0”’s for 
each of the outcomes simulated. These numbers indicated whether each simulated Linda 
character did or did not have the attributes that were to be ordered by probability.
7 The analytic 
                                                           
7 The text of our problem refers to Jessica as opposed to Linda to avoid the possibility that the Sophisticated 
participants might have heard of the “Linda problem.” EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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and experience–based responses are generally opposites for all groups (incorrect and correct, 
respectively). The majority responses for the final answer, however, are correct. 
In Figure 5, experience leads to almost 100% correct responses for the hospital problem 
and the majority of final answers are also correct. For this problem there is a striking order 
effect. In the Sophisticated B group, there is a majority of correct analytic responses. In this case, 
prior experience was probably particularly relevant because no calculations were needed to 
answer the analytic question.  
Figure 6 reports the results of the regression toward the mean problem. The modal 
responses of all groups to the analytic question are centered on the incorrect answer of “equal,” 
thereby suggesting that the respondents did not understand the principle behind the question. The 
effect of experience is to shift answers to being more correct. However, at the final stage the 
Naïve group is not convinced. 
Experience has a big impact for the Monty Hall problem – Figure 7.  Almost everybody 
chooses the correct answer of “change” after experience. However, a minority regress to the 
incorrect answer at the final stage. 
 
Discussion of Experiment 1 
The stimuli in Experiment 1 were chosen precisely because previous research has shown that 
responses to their presentation in a standard probabilistic format typically imply incorrect 
inferences. And yet, when we presented the problems to people in a form that allowed them to 
experience sequentially simulated outcomes, responses for all questions were remarkably 
accurate. To this we add three points.    EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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First, training people to participate in the simulations by using the coin toss example was 
quite easy and took little time, on average some 2 minutes per person. Participants related easily 
to the task of experiencing the outcomes of simulations.    
Second, despite the fact that our participants varied on levels of statistical sophistication, 
the accuracy of all participants’ responses benefited from experience.  
Third, we allowed our participants to choose third, and final, answers thereby requiring 
them to express either a preference for answers achieved with/without the aid of simulated 
experience or some combination of the two. Whereas some participants did revert toward 
answers made without experience, a large majority gave more weight to those achieved through 
experience. 
It is important to emphasize that we did not give participants any indications as to how 
large their samples of experienced outcomes should be. What we found was that the 
Sophisticated participants sampled more than the Naïve and some problems involved 
systematically more sampling than others. For example, the Bayesian and birthday problems 
both involved the largest numbers of trials (means of approximately 80 to 90 for the 
Sophisticated groups) whereas the Linda problem stimulated far fewer trials (around 30 for all 
groups). However, in this problem, participants had to simulate multiple outcomes for each 
individual sampled thereby experiencing vectors of “1’s” or “0’s” and not just single “1’s” or 
“0’s.” Thus, the task was more cognitively taxing. 
An interesting benchmark for the amount of sampling undertaken by our participants is 
the behavior observed by Hertwig, Barron, Weber, and Erev (2004) in a paradigm where 
participants learned the features of two alternative choice options by active sampling of 
experience (in a manner quite similar to ours, i.e., by clicking a key on a personal computer). In EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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Hertwig et al.’s study, the median number of observations sampled was 15, far less than the 
medians we observed of 52, 51, and 30 (for Sophisticated A and B, and Naïve, respectively).  
The reason why our samples are bigger is unclear although it is interesting that Lejarraga (2010) 
– using the same paradigm as Hertwig et al. (2004) – found that more analytically oriented 
participants sampled more than the less analytical, a result that parallels our finding that the 
Sophisticated groups experienced larger samples than the Naïve. 
8 
  Clearly, there are some normative principles that participants should follow in 
determining sample size. For example, if there are relatively few “1’s” or “0’s,” the distribution 
may well be skewed in which case a larger sample should be experienced than if the number of 
“1’s” or “0’s” is more equal. In our data, there are no hints of such awareness. 
 The seven inferential problems we chose to use as stimuli were selected for two reasons.  
The first (noted already above) was that we wanted to test our ideas on problems that were well-
known so that we could better assess improvements in the quality of statistical inferences 
achieved after participants had been exposed to experience. The second reason was that if our 
suggested “method” were to work well across a range of situations as opposed to within 
variations of the same problem (e.g., different Bayesian updating tasks), it would provide a 
stronger test of its efficacy. Indeed, as was noted, the methodology was successful across a range 
of problems.  
As noted before, Participants in B often transformed their calculations to obtain the result 
they had experienced in the simulation, using this as a cue to the answer. This suggests that 
                                                           
8 Lejarraga (2010) compared his participants using Pacini and Epstein’s (1999) scales of rational ability and 
engagement. EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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simulated experience can play an important role in providing insights to improve the quality of 
analytical thinking. 
However, despite these outcomes, one might still argue that in many cases an alternative 
method such as summarizing natural frequencies should still be preferred because it is simpler to 
implement. (For example, you don’t have to construct a simulation model.)  We therefore sought 
to examine the efficacy of experiencing simulated outcomes in a situation where it is less 
obvious how an alternative presentation could be achieved using a natural frequency presentation 
format. Experiment 2 was designed to do just this. 
   
Experiment 2 
Design 
  The design of Experiment 2 involved between-subject comparisons of two groups that  
were required to answer questions based either on the analytical description of a problem that 
used regression analysis or after gaining experience with a simulation tool. We label the groups 
as Analytic and Experience, respectively, except that there were two subgroups in the Experience 
condition. One involved statistically sophisticated, graduate students in economics whom we 
label Sophisticated, and who were similar to respondents in the Analytic group. The other was 
comprised of university-educated adults without advanced statistical knowledge whom we refer 
to as Naïve.
9 We therefore make comparisons between three subgroups:  Analytic, Sophisticated, 
and Naïve.   
(Insert Figures 8 and 9 about here) 
 
  
                                                           
9  Specifically, these participants did not know what “regression analysis” is. EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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The problem set-up and method 
  Figure 8 provides the wording of the problem set-up for participants in the Analytic 
condition. As can be seen, the problem involves an investment situation, which requires 
allocating funds (40 credits) across three alternatives: “Investment 1”, “Investment 2”, and “no 
investment.”  The profitability of the two investment opportunities are described by a regression 
model. The specific questions were:     
1.  How would you allocate your 40 credits in order to expect an increase of 5 credits (obtain 
45 credits)? How much of 40 credits in Investment 1, how much in Investment 2, how 
much in N (no-investment)? 
2.  Given your investment decision in (1), what would you say is the probability of your 
obtaining a final total credit amount that is below 40 (Y<40), i.e. less than what you have 
started with? 
3.  Given your investment decision in (1), what would you say is the probability of your 
obtaining a final total credit amount that is below 45 (Y<45)? 
4.  Given your investment decision in (1), what would you say is the probability that you 
will get a larger outcome with respect to a person who does not invest in Investments 1 
and 2 (someone with N=40)?      
 The statistical rationales for the answers are provided in Appendix C. 
  Figure 9 depicts the simulation interface for the Experience group. When conducting the 
experiment, we sat down one-by-one with the participants in this group, explained briefly how 
the tool works, and then asked them to choose an investment plan so that they can expect to 
increase their 40 credits to 45 (the same as question 1 above). We allowed them to experience as 
many choice options as they wished. Once they made their decisions, we asked them to answer EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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questions 2, 3, and 4 above. Once again, we allowed them to utilize the simulation tool and they 
could experience the outcomes of their choices as many times as they desired. Moreover, we 
made sure that the participants could see all their choices and outcome histories and even 
calculate and compare averages of their past outcomes. 
 
Participants 
The Analytic group consisted of 26 graduate students in economics at Universitat 
Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona who had at least completed their first and second semesters. This 
ensures that all of them had taken at least one graduate course in econometrics and were 
knowledgeable about linear regression analysis and its interpretation. They did not have a time 
limit. Participation was voluntary and anonymous. Participants could use any tools they wanted 
and, upon completion of the survey, they slid the questionnaire into a sealed box in front of an 
office. The average age of this group was 25 and 30% were female. Of 35 surveys distributed, 26 
were completed.  
The Sophisticated participants within the Experience group consisted of 28 graduate 
students in economics drawn from the same population as the Analytic group. The Naïve 
participants were 18 members of the general public having university degrees but no knowledge 
of regression analysis. They were recruited from the contacts of one of the authors. Their mean 
age was 35 (range from 23 to 60) and 40% were female.  
Before participating in the experiment, a chocolate bar was donated to each of the 
participants. 
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Results of Experiment 2 
Table 4 documents the means (standard deviations) of different variables – the decisions taken, 
and answers to the required probabilistic inferences – for the different experimental conditions.   
The first two rows of the table (labeled I1 and I2) indicate the mean amounts invested in 
Investments 1 and 2, respectively, by the different subgroups. According to the regression 
results, these two investments differ in the expected level and variability of their returns – 
Investment 1 having both greater expected return and more variability than Investment 2. On 
average, therefore, it can be observed that the Analytic participants adopt less risky strategies 
than their Sophisticated counterparts but that all three subgroups select investment strategies that 
essentially meet the demands of the first question, i.e., to achieve an expected target of 45.  
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
  Question 2 asks for the probability that the investment strategies will lead to outcomes of 
less than 40 (i.e., the amounts participants started with). The accuracy of each participant’s 
response can be assessed by calculating the difference between the response itself and its 
normative counterpart (i.e., the correct response implied by the regression analysis).  Using this 
measure, we note that whereas the Analytic group seriously underestimates the probability that Y 
is less than 40 (the average deviation from the correct answer is -16% with standard deviation 
9%) this is not the case for the Experience group: 0% for Sophisticated (SD, 11%) and 5% for 
Naïve (SD, 9%). The difference between the Analytic and Experience conditions is significant (t 
= 7.1, p < 0.001).    
Question 3 asks for the probability that the investment strategies will lead to outcomes of 
less than 45 (i.e., the investment target). On average, answers to this question are all quite 
accurate. In fact, these responses are consistent with answers to the first question that lead to EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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expectations of, on average, about 45, that is, with a symmetric predictive distribution there is as 
much chance of exceeding as falling short of the target. 
  Question 4 asks for the probability that the chosen investment strategy will lead to 
outcomes superior to a strategy of no investment. The Analytic group overestimates this 
probability (the average deviation from the correct answer is 24% with standard deviation 10%) 
while this is again not the case for the two subgroups in the Experience condition: 1% for 
Sophisticated (SD, 16%) and 3% for Naïve (SD, 8%). Again, the difference between the Analytic 
and Experience conditions is significant (t = 7.7, p < 0.001).
10    
 
Discussion of Experiment 2 
Unlike the specific probabilistic inference tasks of Experiment 1, Experiment 2 required 
participants to choose an investment plan and make probabilistic inferences based on their own 
idiosyncratic decisions. Also unlike several tasks of Experiment 1, it is unclear how one could 
have provided alternative representations of the questions asked in the form of natural 
frequencies. However, like the representations of all tasks in Experiment 1, participants in the 
Experience group experienced data in the form of sequentially generated outcomes. 
Experiment 2 only permitted between-subject comparisons. In brief, we found – holding 
analytical ability constant – that Sophisticated participants gave more accurate probabilistic 
inferences when allowed to experience simulated outcomes than those who were required to 
solve problems analytically. Second, there was little or no difference in accuracy of probabilistic 
inferences between the groups of Sophisticated and Naïve participants who experienced 
                                                           
10 For questions 3 and 4, there are no significant differences between the (response-correct) measures of the two 
subgroups in the Experience condition.  EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
25 
 
simulated outcomes. These results are important. They suggest that the ability to encode 
frequencies in the form of sequentially experienced frequency data can be harnessed to improve 
probabilistic inferences across a wide range of tasks. 
We note also that the questions posed in Experiment 2 are important for decision makers 
considering investment plans. In such situations, individuals would primarily base their decisions 
on the chances of being worse off with respect to their starting point, to their goal and to other 
individuals who do not make these particular investments.  In a recent survey (Soyer & Hogarth, 
2010); we posed a simpler (univariate) version of this problem to economic scholars from 
prestigious universities. These respondents made the same kinds of mistake as the Analytic 
group in Experiment 2.  
   Finally, we note that for both the Experience subgroups, we collected data on numbers of 
simulations for each choice. Before deciding on a final investment plan, the Sophisticated 
simulated an average of 7 different strategies some 19 times each. The Naïve simulated an 
average of 5 strategies about 8 times each. Thus, as in Experiment 1, we find that more 





The main theoretical concept underlying our work is simple. People can successfully perform 
complex intellectual tasks if these are presented in a format that exploits their natural abilities for 
processing information. In Experiment 1, we investigated seven probabilistic inference problems 
that have a long history of eliciting erroneous responses. The human ability we identified was the EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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capacity to encode the outcomes of sequentially generated outcomes experienced across time.  
Thus, when we presented problems in a format that allowed participants to use this natural 
ability, we observed vastly more accurate probabilistic inferences than those elicited after 
presentation of the standard probabilistic format. Moreover, this result held for both between- 
and within-subject comparisons and across participants varying in statistical sophistication.  In 
Experiment 2, we obtained similar results using what are arguably more complex problems 
involving inferences from a regression equation modeling investment decisions. Taken together, 
our work suggests a strategy for a general approach to help people make appropriate probabilistic 
inferences. 
It is important to stress that our work builds on the illuminating contribution of 
Gigerenzer and his colleagues (notably Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995) who showed how the use 
of natural frequencies – as opposed to probabilities – leads to simpler and more accurate 
calculations in probabilistic inference (notably for Bayesian updating). We reasoned, however, 
that Gigerenzer and his colleagues did not take their own arguments about human abilities to 
handle frequency data to their logical conclusion. Instead of presenting people with problems 
framed in terms of aggregated frequencies (that still require some calculations), we advocate 
letting people experience the raw data as generated from the underlying process or, if not 
possible, from a simulation model. Indeed, this is essentially the same technique that is used to 
provide non-human animals with information in investigations of their reasoning skills except, of 
course, that the animals do not typically intervene and determine the number of trials. Moreover, 
the animals are seen to be quite skilled (Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 2004).  
At one level, our work can be viewed through the perspective that has recently been 
popularized by the expression “choice architecture” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). This is a EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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recognition that, since the variety of tasks the human mind confronts is much larger than the 
variety of responses that humans can make, much can be gained by designing tasks in ways that 
allow humans to make appropriate choices.  Of course, this is not a new principle. In psychology 
it can be traced to the work of Brunswik (1952) and was further elaborated by Simon (1978) and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) (see also Hogarth, 1982). However, it is one thing to elaborate 
such a principle at a general level; it is quite another to demonstrate how it works in specific 
situations and to define boundary conditions. 
A number of questions can be raised about the boundary conditions of our proposal. We 
consider five issues: (1) How much and what kind of experience do people need to make 
appropriate responses?  (2) Do people trust simulation mechanisms?  Why or why not? (3) How 
general is the simulation technique or, in other words, can models be easily constructed for all 
types of situations? (4) How does experience in the form of simulated outcomes solve the 
problem of understanding probabilities of unique events?  (5) How does simulated experience 
relate to the distinction sometimes made between intuitive and analytic processes?  We now 
consider each of these questions. 
(1) In our experiments, we deliberately let participants determine the amount of 
information – in terms of number of trials – that they wanted to experience. This procedure raises 
two issues. First, how much experience – that is number of trials – do people need to reach 
conclusions with which they feel comfortable? Second, does being actively involved in the 
sampling process make a difference compared to simply observing outcomes?   
Our data did show a relation between statistical sophistication and sample size with the 
more sophisticated requiring larger samples. Thus, we suspect that individual differences could 
play a role in the answers to both questions. We also believe that the two questions are important EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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and demand further research. For example, it would be relatively easy to conduct experiments 
varying both sample size and active intervention in as opposed to passive observation of the 
sampling process and to elicit not only probabilistic inferences but measures of confidence in 
such assessments. We suspect that active participation is an important factor – possibly 
interacting with sample size – but reserve judgment in that, in animal studies, the organisms 
typically do not intervene in the sampling process. 
(2) The degree of transparency of the sampling mechanism is clearly important. This may 
have several dimensions. One is the level of the participant’s familiarity with the data generating 
process. For instance, it is probably easy for the participant to understand the coin toss example 
with which we introduced the simulation technique in Experiment 1, and particularly since the 
evidence would typically confirm prior beliefs that there should be roughly as many “heads” as 
“tails.” On the other hand, simulating birthdates of different groups of 25 people in the birthday 
problem might seem odd as well as the fact that the experiential evidence typically runs counter 
to prior intuitions. At the same time, when people have little insight into the structure of a 
problem – as occurs in both the hospital and Monty Hall problems – living the experience of 
many outcomes can be quite illuminating.   
However, if the participant already understands the structure of the problem – as happens 
in the conjunction problem – and recognizes that her capacity for calculation is deficient, she 
might welcome the simulation tool. In fact, Lejarraga (2010) essentially tested this hypothesis by 
letting people decide whether they wanted to choose between gambles based on description (i.e., 
where probabilities of different branches leading to outcomes were indicated) or experience 
(after simulating outcomes). The same pairs of gambles were presented to three different groups 
of participants but varied in the complexity (number of branches) used to describe them. As EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
29 
 
problem complexity increased, groups displayed a greater tendency to make their choices after 
experiencing outcomes as opposed to trusting their analytical abilities to figure out the 
implications of the presentation by description. 
Finally, it is easy to dismiss simulated experience as simply being the outcome of a 
“black box.” However, we believe a more appropriate metaphor is that of a “grey box” where 
individuals experience outcomes generated by a computer as opposed to those arising from the 
naturally occurring environment. But much research is needed to determine what affects the 
different shades of grey and thus the conditions under which people do or do not feel 
comfortable in relying on outcomes of simulated experience. 
(3) Our third question centers on limits to the generality of the simulation technique 
itself. At a conceptual level, and given sufficient ingenuity on the part of the investigator, there is 
almost no technical limit to the probabilistic situations that can be constructed. Whether they are 
meaningful, however, is another issue that can be viewed from two perspectives: the reality 
being modeled and the experience of the user. For the latter, the critical issue is that already 
discussed above, namely the shade of grey of the box. For the former, it should be clear that the 
models are only as good as the fit of their assumptions to reality. As we see it, the goal of 
simulated experience is not necessarily to reach a precise probabilistic answer to a problem but 
more a means of gaining insight into effects of assumptions made about the structure of the 
problem as well as reaching an approximate answer. Thus, it would be illuminating to employ 
techniques of sensitivity analysis and to experience, say in a Bayesian updating task, how 
different assumptions concerning prior probabilities or base-rates result in different sequences of 
outcomes.    EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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(4) Our fourth issue speaks to the meaning of probability. The main distinction is whether 
the concept is something that applies to unique events (e.g., the probability that a particular 
person has a certain disease) or classes of events (e.g., that people that belong to a particular 
group have the disease). This distinction has been given different names in the literature, for 
example, epistemic as opposed to aleatory, or singular versus distributional (Reeves & Lockhart, 
1993). Although from the subjectivist or Bayesian perspective a probability simply measures a 
degree of belief such that the distinction is irrelevant, there is much evidence that people’s 
intuitions of the probability concept are more clearly aligned with the distributional perspective 
(see Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). For example, people relate more easily to a statement that a 
fair coin tossed 100 times is expected to show heads roughly 50% of the time than the statement 
that the probability of heads on a single toss of the coin is 0.5. For the former, there is some 
informational “certainty” in the 50%.  For the latter, 0.5 is a statement of total uncertainty. The 
experience of simulated outcomes clearly taps into people’s distributional intuitions about the 
meaning of probability and this, in part, may explain why they find it illuminating. 
  (5) If experience is so powerful, why, it can be asked, did our participants not all state 
that their final answers were the same as those reached after experiencing simulated outcomes?  
Indeed, by failing to do so, participants in the Sophisticated group in Experiment 1 actually lost 
money. One reason has already been alluded to above, namely, participants may not have always 
trusted experience in the form of simulated outcomes. Another and related reason could be what 
might be called a clash of intuitions.    
  Although we referred to answers given by participants without experience in Experiment 
1 as being “analytic,” it should be clear that many of these responses were driven by intuitive 
reactions. Indeed, the problems are interesting precisely because past studies have shown that EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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people’s intuitive reactions are typically contrary to analytic principles. The Linda problem is a 
prime example. When unaided by formal analysis or simulated experience, people are strongly 
drawn by intuition to believe that it is more likely that Linda is “a bank teller and active in the 
feminist movement” than that she is “a bank teller.”  Now, reactions to experience in the form of 
sequential frequency data could also be classified as intuitive (Hogarth, 2001). Thus, in many 
cases, our respondents faced a conflict between two intuitions, one being their reactions to the 
analytic presentation format, the other being their feelings after the experience they sampled.  As 
the evidence shows, the latter form of intuition did not always overcome the former. 
  That there should be a link between sequentially encoded frequency information and 
intuition has been emphasized by Sedlmeier (2005; 2007) who, in addition, modeled this as a 
process of associative learning (Sedlmeier, 1999). Moreover, in exploring different ways to train 
people to reason probabilistically, his 1999 “flexible urn” concept is perhaps closest to our 
suggestions in that it involves both perceiving simulated data dynamically and some active 
involvement with a computer interface. However, most of his work – and suggestions – have 
focused on different ways of presenting information in the form of aggregate natural frequencies 
as opposed to sequentially observed frequency data (see, e.g., Sedlmeier, 2000; Sedlmeier & 
Gigerenzer, 2001).   
Our work also speaks to the issue of whether and when to trust intuition or analysis in 
making a judgment (Hogarth, 2001; 2005; Kahneman & Klein, 2009). If we classify the analytic 
responses as being “analysis and intuition” and the experience judgments as “intuition,” it is 
clear that intuition alone is better in that the latter produced the highest proportions of correct 
responses. However, it would be erroneous to draw any general conclusions from our study 
largely because our stimuli in Experiment 1 were specifically chosen for their history of EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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inappropriate responses. What we have shown is that intuitive processes based on experiencing 
simulated frequency data result in quite accurate probabilistic inferences across a range of 
problems (i.e., in both Experiments 1 and 2). 
Our investigation raises an important practical issue: What advice might one give, say, to 
a physician who should be using Bayesian updating to assess how likely a patient is to have a 
specific disease following a positive test result? Should you just give her the correct Bayesian 
answer? The answer is probably no because unless she fully understands how the number is 
calculated, she is unlikely to believe it. 
The classic advice would be to teach the physician Bayes’ theorem but, unless this is 
replicated on many occasions, it is unlikely that she will be able to reproduce accurate answers in 
the future. A better approach would be instruction using the natural frequency approach but, once 
again, how well this would be recalled on future occasions is unclear. (However, see Sedlmeier 
& Gigerenzer, 2001.) We believe that simulated experience provides a level of understanding 
that would help the physician understand why the standard Bayesian and natural frequency 
approaches are correct. In fact, our position is to advocate using simulated experience as a means 
to reinforce understanding the natural frequency approach. In this way, the physician could reach 
conclusions that do not involve any conflict between intuition (based on experiencing simulated 
outcomes) and analysis (based on natural frequency calculations). In time, this would allow the 
physician to use the natural frequency approach directly (and particularly if there is no available 
simulation technology). As an additional point, we see potential in the idea that simulated 
experience could provide a useful way of communicating statistical information. For example, 
physicians might use simulated experience to provide patients with a better understanding of the 
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on analyses and past data could lead to more accurate calibration of expectations and 
consequently better decisions.  
In related work, we have shown that knowledgeable economists have difficulties in 
making correct inferences given the standard presentation modes in the economics literature 
(Soyer & Hogarth, 2010). In this case, economists’ inferences are blind to different levels of 
uncertainty as they tend to rely disproportionately on the statistical significance of regression 
coefficients. The results of Experiment 2 provide insight into how simulated experience might be 
used to aid decision makers in interpreting statistical outcomes. It could help in taking different 
levels of risk into account and in identifying variables that are not only statistically significant 
but economically important. The distinction between statistical significance and economic 
importance is discussed in Ziliak and McCloskey (2008). 
  These last points speak to the importance of using simulated experience for teaching 
probability and statistics at all levels – from grade school through university and beyond. 
Nowadays, it is relatively simple to build simulation models for all kinds of applications and 
problems and with the widespread availability of personal computers – linked by the internet – 
there is no reason why the simple idea championed in this paper could not have wide application. 
Indeed, the Statistics Online Computational Resource (SOCR) website – www.socr.ucla.edu – 
provides a repository of elegant simulations and applets for many probabilistic problems, 
including several featured in Experiment 1. Moreover, Dinov, Sanchez, and Christou (2008) 
have shown that using the website while teaching statistics enhances students’ understanding and 
retention of concepts.    
One could also envisage a computer tool in the form of an expert system that could aid 
people with little statistical sophistication to build their own simulation models and thereby gain EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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insight into a variety of inferential problems. Indeed, one could even imagine such programs 
being developed for cell phones such that they could be almost as common as calculators.  
  At the head of this article is a quote from Carl Rogers (1961). At first sight, this might 
appear odd for research developed from a cognitive view of psychology.  However, what Rogers 
was emphasizing – and where we concur – is that the understanding that really changes behavior 
is that which comes through self-directed and experienced learning. For this and other reasons 
already enumerated, we maintain that simulated experience can be an effective route to gain 
insight into the nature of probabilistic reasoning and thereby guide behavior to meet the demands 
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1.  Bayesian updating 
 
Assume you conduct breast cancer screening using mammography in a certain region. You know 
the following information about the women in this region: 
 
The probability that a woman has breast cancer is 1% (prevalence) 
If a woman has breast cancer, the probability that she tests positive is 90% (sensitivity) 
If a woman does not have breast cancer, the probability that she nevertheless tests positive is 9% 
(false-positive rate) 
 
A woman – chosen at random – gets breast screening and the test results show that she has cancer. 
What is the probability that she has cancer?  
 
a) The probability that she has breast cancer is about 81%. 
b) Out of 10 women with a positive mammogram, about 9 have breast cancer. 
c) Out of 10 women with a positive mammogram, about 1 has breast cancer. 
d) The probability that she has breast cancer is about 1%.   
 
 
2.  Birthday problem 
 




3.  Conjunction problem 
 
A project has 7 parts. The success of the project depends on the success of these parts. In order to 
be successful, all its parts need to be successful. 
 
Assume that each part is independent from the others and each has a 75% success rate.  
 
What is the probability that the project will be successful? 












4.  Linda problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) 
 
Jessica is 31 years old, single, candid, and very promising. She graduated in philosophy. As a 
student, she was anxious about discrimination issues and social justice, and also took part in anti-
nuclear demonstrations.  
 
Assign a rank to the following statements from most probable to least probable: 
 
a) Jessica works in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes. 
b) Jessica is active in the feminist movement. 
c) Jessica is a psychiatric social worker. 
d) Jessica is a member of the League of Women Voters. 
e) Jessica is a bank teller. 
f) Jessica is an insurance salesperson. 
g) Jessica is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. 
 
 
5.  The hospital problem  (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) 
 
A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital about 45 babies are born each day. 
In the smaller hospital about 15 babies are born each day. As you know, about 50 percent of all 
babies are girls. However, the exact percentage varies from day to day. Sometimes it may be 
higher than 50 percent, sometimes lower. For a period of 1 year, each hospital recorded the days 
on which more than 60 percent of the babies born were girls. 
 
Which hospital do you think recorded more such days? 
 
a) the larger hospital? 
b) the smaller hospital? 
c) about the same for both hospitals? 











6.  Regression toward the mean 
 
A class of students enters in a TOEFL exam (it is a standardized test of English language). One of 
the students gets a better result than 90% of the class.  
 
The same class, including the person who had done better than 90% of his class, enters another 
TOEFL exam.  Past data suggest that the correlation between the scores of the different exams is 
about 0.8.  
 
Which statement is correct?  
 
a) It is more likely that the student in question now gets a better ranking. 
b) It is more likely that the student in question now gets a worse ranking. 
c) The chances that he gets a better ranking or a worse one are approximately equal.  
 
 
7.  Monty Hall problem 
 
There are three doors A, B and C. We randomly selected one of them and put a Ferrari behind it. 
Behind the remaining two doors there is nothing.  
 
You will select a door and we will open it. You will win the game if there is Ferrari behind it. 
   
Now select a door. (The participant makes a selection, say A). 
 
Before we open the door you selected, we open B and show you that there is nothing behind it. 
Now two doors remain: A and C. Behind one of them is a Ferrari. Given this situation, please state 
if you would like to 
 
a)  Stay with your original selection 
b)  Change to the other door  




Table 3. Percentages of correct answers to inferential problems by experimental conditions 
                 
           Sophisticated  Naive    Mean   
    A    B         
1. Bayesian updating               
Analytic     17    42  20    27   
Experience     97    97  100    98   
Final     79    58  70    69   
                  
2. Birthday problem                
Analytic     3    13  0    6   
Experience     55    61  65    60   
Final     35    61  30    44   
                 
3. Conjunction problem                 
Analytic     55    52  25    47   
Experience     74    77  75    75   
Final     77    77  75    77   
                 
4. Linda problem                  
Analytic     10    32  10    18   
Experience     97    97  90    95   
Final     65    71  60    66   
                 
5. Hospital problem                
Analytic     39    61  25    44   
Experience     97    97  100    98   
Final     81    68  65    72   
                 
6. Regression toward mean                
Analytic     32    45  25    35   
Experience     68    90  70    77   
Final     55    65  35    54   
                   
7. Monty Hall               
Analytic     31    48  15    34   
Experience     93    97  95    95   
Final     69    58  55    61   









  Condition:    Analytic  Experience 
        Sophisticated  Naive 
  (n=    26  28  18) 
Decisions           
  I1    3.5  5.7  6.7 
      <4.6>  <3.9>  <5.9> 
            
  I2    12.3  7.8  9.8 
      <7.0>  <4.5>  <7.7> 
           
Expected outcome         
  Y    45.5  45.2  46.3 
      <0.9>  <1.6>  <2.1> 
           
Prob (Y<40)          
Question 2:  Response - Correct  -16%  0%  5% 
      <9%>  <11%>  <9%> 
           
Prob (Y<45)          
Question 3:  Response - Correct  2%  1%  6% 
      <2%>  <12%>  <9%> 
           
Prob(Y|I1,I2) > Prob(Y|no investment)        
Question 4:  Response - Correct  24%  1%  3% 
      <10%>  <16%>  <8%> 
           




























Figure 1. Histograms of answers given to the Bayesian updating problem 
Sample sizes for Sophisticated A, Sophisticated B and Naïve are 29, 31 and 20 respectively. 
The numbers on the columns represent the number of answers.  
The green (dashed) column represents the correct answer.  




























Figure 2. Histograms of answers given to the birthday problem 
Sample sizes for Sophisticated A, Sophisticated B and Naïve are 31, 31 and 20 respectively. 
The numbers on the columns represent the number of answers.  
The green (dashed) column represents the correct answer.  




























Figure 3. Histograms of answers given to the conjunction problem 
Sample sizes for Sophisticated A, Sophisticated B and Naïve are 31, 31 and 20 respectively. 
The numbers on the columns represent the number of answers.  
The green (dashed) column represents the correct answer.  




























Figure 4. Histograms of answers given to the Linda problem 
Sample sizes for Sophisticated A, Sophisticated B and Naïve are 31, 31 and 20 respectively. 
The numbers on the columns represent the number of answers.  
The green (dashed) column represents the correct answer.  
 




























Figure 5. Histograms of answers given to the hospital problem 
Sample sizes for Sophisticated A, Sophisticated B and Naïve are 31, 31 and 20 respectively. 
The numbers on the columns represent the number of answers.  
The green (dashed) column represents the correct answer.  




























Figure 6. Histograms of answers given to the regression toward the mean problem 
Sample sizes for Sophisticated A, Sophisticated B and Naïve are 31, 31 and 20 respectively. 
The numbers on the columns represent the number of answers.  
The green (dashed) column represents the correct answer.  




Sample sizes for Sophisticated A, Sophisticated B and Naïve are 29, 31 and 20 respectively. 
The numbers on the columns represent the number of answers.  
The green (dashed) column represents the correct answer.  
Figure 7. Histograms of answers given to the Monty Hall problem 




Figure 8:  Experiment 2 Analytic group set-up 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. It is anonymous, please do not write you name. 
 
Here you will be asked to make an investment decision. You are given 40 credits. You can allocate these 
40 credits in 3 ways:  
 
I1 : You can invest some in “Investment 1” 
I2 : You can invest some in “Investment 2” 
N   : You can choose not to invest some of it. 
 
You can choose how much to put in each of these 3 options, provided that your choices add up to 40. The 
relationship between the investments and their effect on the outcome is given by the following linear 
equation: 
i i i i e Y + I + I + = D , 2 2 , 1 1 b b a  
Where “ Y D ”  is the change in resulting credits, “I1”  is the amount invested in investment 1, “I2“  is the 
amount invested in investment 2,  “β1“ and “β2“ are the effects of investments on the change in credits and 
“e” is the random perturbation.  
 
The return to each investment is estimated through historical data. Past 1000 investments were taken into 
account for each investment and an OLS regression was conducted to compute the relationship between 
each investment and its return 
 




















This means that both the investments are estimated to have positive and significant effects on the change 
in one’s returns. Specifically, in the average, “Investment 1” is expected to generate a 50% increase and 
“Investment 2” is expected to generate a 30% increase over the invested amount.  
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
 Y  8.4  7.9 
I1  11.1  5.8 
I2  9.6  5.2 
 
  Dependent Variable:  Y 
                          I1             0.5         (0.20)** 
                          I2             0.3         (0.05)** 
            Constant            -0.1         (0.15) 
                          R
2             0.21 
                          N           1 000 
       Standard errors in parentheses 
      ** Significant at 95% confidence level 
        N is the number of observations EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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Figure 9:  Simulation interface used in the frequency condition 
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Appendix A. Answers to the seven probabilistic inference problems in Experiment 1 
 
1.  Bayesian updating 
 
p (C) = 1% 
p (+ | C ) = 90% 
p (-- | C ) = 9% 
 
p (C | +) =  
{p (C) * p (+ | C)}/{ p (C) * p (+ | C) + (1- p (C)) * p (-- | C) } @ 10% 
 
Thus, the answer is: 
 
c) Out of 10 women with a positive mammogram, about 1 has breast cancer. 
    
 
2.  Birthday problem 
 
There are 365 days in a year. 
The  approximate  probability  of  a  birthday  MATCH  between  any  two  people  is  1/365.  The 
probability of a NO MATCH is thus 364/365. 
The probability of 2 NO MATCHES in a row is (364/365)
2 = 0.9972. 
The probability of n NO MATCHES in a row is (364/365)
n 
There are 300 different combinations of 2 people in a group of 25. 
The probability of 300 NO MATCHES in a row is (364/365)
300 = 44% 
The probability that there is at least one MATCH = 1 – 44% = 56% 
 
Answer is approximately 56%. 
 
 
3.  Conjunction problem 
 
p (parti) = 75% , i = 1, 2, 3, …, 7   
p (success) = p (part1) * p (part2) * … * p (part7) = [p (parti)]




4.  Linda problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) 
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5.  The hospital problem  (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) 
  
b) the smaller hospital…… 
…because smaller sample sizes exhibit more variability. 
 
 

















b) It is more likely that the student in question now gets a worse ranking.   
  
 
7.  Monty Hall problem 
  
The a priori probability that the prize is behind door i (Di ; i = 1, 2, 3) is:  
 
p (Di) = 1 / 3 
 
Assuming that the participant has selected door 1 (D1), the probability that Monty opens door 2 
(O2) is 
 
-  if the prize were behind D1; p (O2 | D1) = 1 / 2  
-  If the prize were behind D2; p (O2 | D2) = 0  
-  if the prize were behind D3; p (O2 | D3) = 1  
 
So, the probability that Monty opens door 2 is: 
 
 





A > B  EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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Using Bayes Theorem, we have: 
 
   









Therefore, the probability of winning is higher (2 / 3) if one changes the door, which implies that 
the optimal strategy is to change the initial choice, so: 
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Appendix B. Statistical tests on differences between proportions of correct answers in 
Experiment 1 
 
Table B1. Difference between the proportions of correct answers in Experience and Analytic 
 
  Sophisticated A  Sophisticated B  Naïve 
  ∆    t  ∆    t  ∆    t 
Bayesian updating  0.79  10.1*  0.55  5.8*  0.80  8.9* 
Birthday problem  0.52  5.4*  0.48  4.6*  0.65  6.1* 
Conjunction problem  0.20  1.6  0.23  2.2*  0.50  3.6* 
Linda problem  0.87  14.1*  0.65  7.2*  0.80  8.4* 
Hospital problem  0.58  6.2*  0.36  3.8*  0.75  7.7* 
Regression toward the mean  0.36  3.0*  0.45  4.3*  0.45  3.1* 
Monty Hall problem  0.62  6.3*  0.49  5.1*  0.80  8.6* 
   (*) indicates significantly positive difference at 95% confidence level 
 
 
Table B2. Difference between the proportions of correct Analytic answers in Sophisticated B and A 
 
  ∆    t 
Bayesian updating  0.25  2.2* 
Birthday problem  0.09  1.4 
Conjunction problem  -0.03  -0.3 
Linda problem  0.23  2.3* 
Hospital problem  0.23  1.8* 
Regression toward the mean  0.13  1.1 
Monty Hall problem  0.19  1.4 
  (*) indicates significantly positive difference at 95% confidence level 
 
 
Table B3. Difference between the proportions of correct answers in Sophisticated A and Naïve   
 
  Analytic  Experience  Final 
  ∆    t  ∆    t  ∆    t 
Bayesian updating  -0.03  -0.2  -0.03  -0.2  0.09  0.7 
Birthday problem  0.03  0.2  -0.10  -0.7  0.06  0.4 
Conjunction problem  0.30  2.3*  -0.01  -0.1  0.02  0.2 
Linda problem  0.00  0.0   0.07  0.9  0.05  0.3 
Hospital problem  0.13  1.05  -0.03  -1.0  0.16  1.2 
Regression toward the mean  0.07  0.6  -0.02  -0.2  0.19  1.4 
Monty Hall problem  0.16  1.4  -0.02  -0.3  0.14  1.0 
  (*) indicates significantly positive difference at 95% confidence level EXPERIENCING SIMULATED OUTCOMES  
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Appendix C: Rationale for answers to the four questions in Experiment 2 
Question 1  
This question was posed to elicit an answer from the participants. We wanted them to make an 
investment decision with a particular expectation about the results it would lead to. The answers 
given suggested that the participants in all groups identified average effects quite accurately.       
Question 2 
This question reflects the desire to obtain a positive outcome given any investment decision. The 
most popular answer for this question in the Analytic group was I1=0 and I2=16.7. We therefore 
base the calculations in this section on these particular values. Answers associated with other 
choices can be calculated analogously.  
The answer to Question 2 depends on the standard deviation of the estimated residuals 
(SDER). In a linear regression analysis, SDER
2 corresponds to the variance of the dependent 
variable that is unexplained by the independent variables and is captured by the statistic (1-R
2). 
In the set-up, this is given as 21%. One can compute the SDER using the (1-R
2) statistic and the 
variance of  Y: 
                                                                    (A1) 
Given I1=0 and I2=16.7 the answer to Question 2 becomes: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
                (A2) 
7 ) 21 . 0 )( 9 . 7 ( ) 1 )( ( ( ) ˆ (
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Here, one needs to make similar calculations as for the answer to Question 2. Given I1=0 and 
I2=16.7 the answer to Question 3 becomes: 
   
 
 
    (A3) 
 
Question 4 
This question reflects the desire to be better off with respect to an alternative of no-action in 
terms of Investment 1 and 2. Finding the answer requires making one additional calculation. 
Specifically, we need to know the standard deviation of the difference between two random 
variables, that is 
                  (Yi | X1,i =x1, X2,i =x2 ) – (Yj | X1,j =0, X2,j =0), where x1 > 0 and/or x2 > 0                  (A4)          
We know that (Yi | X1,i =x1, X2,i =x2) is an identically, independently and normally 
distributed random error with an estimated standard deviation of again 7. Given that a different 
and independent shock occurs for different individuals and actions, the standard deviation of 
(A4) becomes: 
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